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Preemption and Just War:
Considering the Case of Iraq
FRANKLIN ERIC WESTER

T

his article demonstrates that the use of military force by the Bush Administration against the regime of Saddam Hussein does not meet the ethical
criteria for “preemptive war” set forth in the classical Just War tradition. It
considers ethical questions raised by the US-led attack against Iraq as part of
the war against global terrorism and argues that the doctrine of preemptive
war as applied in the case of Iraq fails crucial ethical tests.
Could Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism be as
pivotal in the history of ethical decisionmaking as the emergence of the nationstate in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648? Do new ethics for the war on terror
sever the fourth-century Augustinian roots of Just War theory and the ties to
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica 700 years later? Could the first major
war of the 21st century inaugurate a revolution in ethical decisionmaking about
warfare, justifying a new set of criteria for preemption or preventive war? Answers to these questions hinge on whether or not the doctrine of preemption
matures into new ethical criteria. Such criteria would build not on foundations
for constraining unavoidable human violence, but stretch toward a vision of an
ideal of liberty that justifies the selective killing of some to achieve a greater
good of liberty for many others. This emerging ethic installs the United States
as the guardian of a universal, even transcendent, cause of freedom and the ultimate arbiter in that cause.1
This article applies the classic categories of Just War tradition to the
doctrine of preemption as advanced by the current Administration in the justification for Operation Iraqi Freedom. It does not address the range of other explanations for and postures toward war outside the Just War tradition. Specifically,
it does not develop details of three other major ways to think about war:
l Realism, the belief that war is essentially a matter of power, selfinterest, and necessity, largely making moral analysis irrelevant.
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Holy War, the belief that war is an instrument of divine power and
that individuals, groups, or nations apply decisions about violence to coerce or destroy those opposing divine will.
l Pacifism, the belief that all war is intrinsically evil and can never
be justified.2
The article begins with a summary of the national security debate as
expressed in the buildup to war against Iraq, including the views of policy experts and decisionmakers, ethicists and academics. Second, it considers Just
War ethical frameworks and definitions for two facets of warfare: justice in
going to war ( jus ad bellum) and justice in the conduct of war ( jus in bello),
focusing on the six criteria of jus ad bellum. In its attack on Iraq, the Bush
Administration redefined criteria for preemptive and preventive war that do
not satisfy the criteria established in the classical Just War tradition and may
signal development of an emerging ethic.
l

Preemption, Prevention, and
the National Security Strategy Debate
When the National Security Strategy was published by the Bush
Administration in 2002, one of its most notable shifts specified a doctrine
or principle of “preemption.” Preemption—and, more notably, preventive
war—exploded onto the scene of ethical debate as a major change in US security strategy. The 2002 National Security Strategy asserted, the “United States
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient
threat to our national security,” and “the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.”3
This argument is moot if one sees the context of the war against Iraq
as a continuation of the 1991 Desert Storm war, as does ethicist Thomas
Nichols, Chairman of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College, and
as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have.4 Professor Nichols presents an appeal
for debate about how the 2003 attack against Iraq is a proper application of
jus in bello. This argument contends that the leaders of Iraq remained at war
against the coalition despite their signing the 1991 treaty at the end of Desert
Storm; therefore, Operation Iraqi Freedom was not preemption but a justified
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use of force. The two pivotal issues in this regard are Iraq’s defiance of UN
resolutions and pre-war Iraqi aggression. Nichols describes the situation before the war as follows:
In a repeating pattern, Iraq is served notice with [UN] resolutions, agrees to
them, and then breaks them. . . . There is no longer a credible way to envision
any peaceful road to Iraqi disarmament. . . . He [Saddam Hussein] has pledged
and promised and agreed, and then reneged, so many times that only the most
trusting (or cynical) diplomats would encourage him to play and win such a
pointless game one more time.”5

For Nichols, the military attack was morally right and justified based on
Iraq’s noncompliance with international standards. If one concedes Iraq’s
noncompliance, the Just War ethical question then shifts to legitimate authority, away from preemption and just cause. If Iraq was defying the previous coalition or the United Nations, then the legitimate authority for war is not a
US-led “coalition of the willing,” but a more clearly recognized international
body—either the coalition from the 1991 war whose treaty was violated, or
the United Nations, whose resolutions were ignored.
Nichols also states that Iraq did not accept the UN-imposed no-fly
zones intended to prevent humanitarian abuses. “The Iraqis . . . fired on coalition aircraft over 700 times since 1998 alone, in an attempt to harm those engaged in the protection of the innocent—itself an action sufficient to trigger a
presumption of Just War.”6 The anti-aircraft fire of the Iraqis drew bombs and
missiles from coalition aircraft, in a continuing exchange of tactical fires. As
to his second argument that Operation Iraqi Freedom is not a preemptive or
preventive war, Nichols summarizes, “The United States and its allies [were]
already at war with the Iraqis; one cannot ‘preempt’ or ‘preventively attack’ a
regime whose forces one is already attacking on a regular basis.”7
Although Professor Nichols does not view the war against Iraq as
preemptive, the Bush Administration made preemption the reason for resorting to armed conflict. The President and key presidential advisors, including the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense, did not
justify toppling Saddam Hussein primarily as a response to Iraq’s attacks
against coalition forces or the humanitarian needs of Iraqis. The principal
reason for war stated by the Bush Administration to the nation and the world
was the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Disarming
Iraq was the desired end, and regime change in Iraq was the only possible
way to achieve that end. Preemptive military action was required, and thus
justified, to prevent possible use of WMD. As expressed by Alan W.
Dowd, “The Bush Doctrine’s principle of preemption was tailor-made for
Baathist Iraq—a country with growing ties to terror, an underground uncon22
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ventional weapons program, and the means and motive to mete out revenge
on the United States.”8
President Bush addressed preemption in a major policy address at
the US Military Academy on 1 June 2002. He stated, “If we wait for threats to
materialize, we will have waited too long,” and he declared that “our security
will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives.”9 In the background of these
remarks, remember that US and coalition forces were consolidating their
prompt success in scattering the al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan and replacing the neutered Taliban regime with a new government led by Hamid
Karzai. The West Point speech foreshadowed the run-up to the Iraq war of an
economic, political, and by March 2003, a military coalition.10
Beyond the President’s statements, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice amplified the security strategy. She used a graphic analogy to
convey the increased risk of waiting and her rationale for preemptive action:
“We don’t want the smoking gun to become a mushroom cloud.”11
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in an August 2002 interview with Fox News, argued that America could not wait for proof that
Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. He compared the prelude to war
against Iraq with the prelude to World War II, when the Allies appeased Hitler. The Secretary rejected alternative points of view other than war, saying,
“The people who argue [against invading Iraq] have to ask themselves how
they’re going to feel at that point where another event occurs and it’s not a
conventional event, but it’s an unconventional event.”12
Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the Bush Administration’s case to the United Nations Security Council for disarming Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. He provided information from the core assessments made by
the chief UN-appointed inspector, Dr. Hans Blix, indicating ballistic missiles
were moved and hidden from inspectors and that Iraq had failed to account for
biological and other weapons. Secretary Powell did not ask anything of the
UN Security Council. He challenged the Security Council in a general way:
“We must not shrink from the responsibilities that we set before ourselves.”13
In contrast to the unanimous voices from within the Administration
advocating war against Iraq, a former Secretary of State, one often thought of
as a pragmatist and hawkish, Dr. Henry Kissinger, urged a diplomatic approach and cited a potential second-order effect of war against Iraq. He
warned, “It is not in the American national interest to establish pre-emption
as a universal principle available to every nation.”14 He argued not so much
against the war as for the United States to use its power to shape an international response, believing that preemptive or preventive war could destroy
the international order that had prevailed since Westphalia.
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“Preemptive strikes and preemptive war have a
recognized historic and narrowly defined
place in the Just War tradition.”

Interestingly, the 2002 National Security Strategy indirectly acknowledges the Just War ethic. Logic in the document relies on the special
case of preemption based on “imminent threat,” recognizing that Just War tradition makes room for arresting or resisting “imminent threat” as an extension of legitimate self-defense. However, the National Security Strategy goes
on to assert, “We must adapt [that is, change] the concept of imminent threat
to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”15 How to change a
concept like “imminent threat” or the moral reasoning associated with the
Just War ethic is not specified. The National Security Strategy assesses that
the United States faces a new threat from the convergence of rogue states,
failed states, and terrorists operating with potential access to weapons of
mass destruction. This combination makes measuring the imminent nature of
threats so difficult that both preemptive war and preventive war are justified.
In addition, the National Security Strategy concludes that against such adversaries with such weapons, deterrence is no longer possible.
With these introductory aspects of the ethical issues as background,
we now turn to some practical problems in the case of Iraq. The first relates to
the compressed time in moving toward and implementing the current military
doctrine, Rapid Decisive Operations. Military actions connect concepts and
ideas; military decisionmaking connects ethical decisionmaking and outcomes. The question may then be asked, Is preemption just another way to
take “rapid” to the next level? A second practical problem is the risk of a
wrong decision. Given the potential threats cited in the 2002 National Security Strategy and elsewhere, the stakes for either action or inaction are very
high. Just as the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction kept the world in a
precarious balance, a doctrine of preemption elevates the risks of premature
action or useless inaction and increases the danger of mistakes. A nation preempting another nation or group may win a battle against a specific threat, but
lose the war of acting rightly. Right actions include obtaining victory while
addressing the moral duty to prevent destruction of vital resources (e.g., oil)
and Western ways of life (universal human values, inalienable rights), as well
as preventing unnecessary casualties among noncombatants.
24
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A third practical problem is that of having inaccurate or incomplete
information which then becomes “actionable intelligence.” Information overload and faulty patterns of selecting information can create stepping stones to
incorrect decisionmaking. In the case of the war against Iraq, significant complications with human intelligence emerged—relying on people with much to
gain from regime change in Iraq, a shortage of human intelligence sources, and
poor translation of human reports. All conspired to weaken a critical link in
building a case for preemptive or preventive war.
How much accuracy in intelligence is needed? In the case of the US
use of an inaccurate white paper from Great Britain reporting Niger’s providing yellow-cake uranium as a component for weapons of mass destruction,
more information or a better analysis was clearly needed. And in the post hoc
analysis, the findings by Dr. David Kay, chief UN inspector, confirmed
pre-war reports presented by Hans Blix to the UN:
l Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was dormant.
l No evidence suggested that Iraq possessed chemical or biological
weapons.
l But Iraq was attempting to develop missile capability exceeding
the UN-mandated limit of 93 miles.16

Views of Ethicists
Noting these practical problems, we return to some of the ethical difficulties. With preemption included in the National Security Strategy, the reaction of ethicists and academics in social science, law, religion, and philosophy
was prompt, if not widely noticed. Part of the debate occurred in the public
square of newspaper opinion pages and magazines. Even more discussion percolated among academics, and in the Chronicle of Higher Education on 23
September 2002, 100 scholars made a one-sentence declaration: “As Christian
ethicists, we share a common moral presumption against a pre-emptive war on
Iraq by the United States.”17 Signatories ranged from Duke University pacifist
professor Dr. Stanley Hauerwas, to Dr. Shaun Casey, a just-war ethicist from
Wesley College in Washington, D.C.
Some ethicists and religious leaders endorsed military action. Some
saw it as a continuation of the 1991 conflict, while others saw the action in
2003 as moral. For example, one theologian, the Reverend Richard Land,
president of the ethics and religious-liberty commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, endorsed military action on grounds of self-defense: “I believe we are defending ourselves against several acts of war by a man who did
not keep treaties and who has already used weapons of mass destruction.”18
In the press, futurist and military commentator Ralph Peters applauded the war and advanced the position that Operation Iraqi Freedom was
Winter 2004-05
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changing the criteria for imminent threat described in the National Security
Strategy. As previously noted, the strategy document explained we must
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Peters said, “We have cast off old, failed rules of warfare”
for a new paradigm “that makes previous models of warfare obsolete.”19
Responding to Peters, Dr. John Brinsfield (Colonel, USA Ret.), a
former professor at the Army War College and retired Army chaplain, challenged this view:
Adopting pre-emptive strikes (followed by bombing more massive than anything since World War II) should never be a normative part of our ethical thinking about war. To embrace pre-emptive strikes as normal policy rather than a
very narrowly defined exception to the rules of civilized warfare is not to advance to a position of “waging just wars humanely” (quoting Peters) but rather
to retreat to barbarism, waging war whenever we think “might makes right.”20

Another ethicist, Paul Schroeder, summarizing the Administration’s
justification for preemptive war, noted the arguments went largely unexamined and concluded the rationale will quickly prove unacceptable:
The Bush Administration’s case for preemptive war asserts: the dangers and
costs of inaction far outweigh those of acting now. Saddam Hussein, an evil
despot, a serial aggressor, an implacable enemy of the United States, and a direct menace to his neighbors must be deposed before he acquires weapons of
mass destruction that he might use or let others use against Americans or its allies and friends. A few thousand Americans died in the last terrorist attack;
many millions could die in the next one. Time is against us; once Hussein acquires such weapons, he cannot be overthrown without enormous losses and
dangers. Persuasion, negotiation, and conciliation are worse than useless with
him. Sanctions and coercive diplomacy have failed. Conventional deterrence is
equally unreliable. Preemptive action to remove him from power is the only effective remedy and will promote durable peace in the region.
Do we have a right to wage preemptive war against Iraq to overthrow its regime?
Would this be a necessary and just war? What long-range effects would it have on
the international system? On these questions the Administration won by default.
The assumption that a war to overthrow Hussein would be a just war and one that,
if it succeeded without excessive negative side effects, would serve everyone’s
interests went unchallenged in the mainstream. The Administration’s claim of a
right to overthrow regimes it considers hostile is extraordinary—and one the
world will soon find intolerable.21

Preemptive strikes and preemptive war have a recognized historic
and narrowly defined place in the Just War tradition. In the section that follows, the four criteria for anticipatory self-defense will be considered, noting
26
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“Preventive war has no legal or ethical
sanction, because the threat is
neither clear nor present.”

the specific cases of the Caroline in 1837, precipitating events for World War
I, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Preventive war has no legal or ethical sanction, because the threat is neither clear nor present.

Definitions: Preemptive Strike,
Preemptive War, and Preventive War
At this point, let us define and differentiate the terms preemptive
strike, preemptive war, and preventive war. A preemptive strike is a tactical
activity, intended to have a strategic effect. Preemptive strikes may be actions
in war or discrete acts that one nation takes against another apart from war.
Ethically, a preemptive strike in war is evaluated in the category of jus in bello
and is a way to seize the initiative. A preemptive strike may be preceded by
warnings and is not necessarily a “sneak attack.” The Confederate attack
against Fort Sumter illustrates a preemptive strike. In a more recent example,
perhaps the most well-known modern preemptive strike not associated with
war is the long-distance attack by Israel in 1984 against Iraq. Israel successfully destroyed a nuclear power plant in Iraq based on the suspicion that eventually Saddam Hussein would have the means for a missile attack with a
nuclear weapon against Israel.
In comparison, a preemptive war is associated with one aspect of
the just cause standard of going to war ( jus ad bellum). If attack is imminent,
with a clear and present danger, a nation is right to defend itself. With Egypt’s
tanks on Israel’s border in the Sinai as a clear and present danger, Israel
launched the 1967 war. Also, the act of proceeding to war before actual attack
is moral when the threat is real and so near at hand that launching war could
be considered self-defense. A nation or nations also may rightly intercede
to prevent humanitarian abuses, even inside the boundaries of another sovereign nation.
In contrast, a preventive war is started well before the imminent
threat or humanitarian crisis, when the balance of forces is the primary consideration. As noted above, a preemptive war is launched at a time close to a
documented or presumed threat, when the forces initiating war retain tactical,
Winter 2004-05
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operational, or strategic advantage. Preventive war, on the other hand, is built
on a sheer calculation of advantage—nation X can gain an advantage by acting now to attack nation Y, regardless of the threat. By launching a war now, a
later conflict—more costly in human life, national resources, or even lost victory—is avoided. The justification for such a war must withstand the critique
of a just intent standard.22

Six Criteria for Jus ad Bellum
The next two sections summarize the criteria of Just War ethics and
apply these six criteria to the case of Iraq. By definition, ethical discourse
about preventive or preemptive war fits in the category of jus ad bellum
( justice in going to war).23 The six criteria are as follows.
l Legitimate authority. Different countries assign different legitimate authorities for declaring war. In the United States, though the Constitution specifies Congress as the agent to declare war, the unresolved tension
between the President wielding the War Powers Act and the control of appropriations by the Congress has functioned sufficiently to legitimize war by US
forces. In cases of international forces, recognized organizations and institutions have formal procedures for legitimizing military power.
l Public declaration. National leaders or leaders of international
organizations or institutions are called on to announce intentions to pursue
war and to provide the conditions for avoiding or ending conflict.24
l Just intent. A general rule for just intent, or just cause in going to
war, is to restore the status quo ante bellum, a return to international relations
when war was not pursued. Other facets of just intent are to protect the innocent, recover something wrongly taken, punish evil, or defend against wrongful attack.25
l Proportionality. This criterion focuses on restraint and precision
in the use of force. Warfare presents notorious difficulty in predicting its
costs—both human and economic—yet the application of military force is legitimate only to the degree it takes account of such effects and outcomes.
l Last resort. This criterion presents a logical conundrum. In theory, something else can always be done. The point of this specification is to
clarify that force is justified only as a sad necessity after other good faith ways
to avoid or resolve conflict have failed.
l Reasonable hope of success. Leaders make a morally grave decision to commit the lives of their military forces, and those of innocent civilians, to death for the hope of reversing the cause of going to war. Only conflict
with some expectation of restoration to an acceptable status quo is usually
ethical. Revenge and “suicide stands” are not moral choices in cases where
there is no hope whatever of success.
28
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Asserting the Bush Administration
Did Not Meet the Just War Criteria
l Legitimate Authority. The first test of legitimate authority includes determining the legitimacy of the person as a rightful office-holder. In
the case of President Bush, there is certainty that he is the legitimate national
leader acting properly in his role in the United States. Gerald Bradley, law
professor at Notre Dame, asserts that the morally upright leadership of the
President of the United States in concert with credible advisors is recognized,26 and that assertion is uncontested here.
A second test of legitimate authority focuses on whether the officeholder is in a position to properly authorize war. In the case of the war
against Iraq, in which President Bush led a “coalition of the willing,” this aspect is in doubt. Consider the proper authority criterion along a continuum
of legitimacy. From the most to the least credible authority for taking military action against a nation-state or national leader, the continuum would
be: (1) unanimous international commitment, (2) a United Nations decision,
(3) a UN Security Council decision, (4) other regional or international alliance, (5) an ad hoc coalition, (6) unilateral action. Viewing these frameworks as being from most to least legitimate and compelling, the US-led coalition is in the range of 5 to 6. Even the strongest advocates for military
action against Iraq express the legitimate authority for the war as being
based on a loose coalition of nations. Critics describe the military action as
being a case of a limited number of nations trailing along behind the United
States out of obligation, or, more bluntly, describe the war as unilateral action by the United States.
If the reason for going to war was based on violations of UN sanctions by Iraq, then the United Nations would be the legitimating authority. If
the war was based on international humanitarian concern for the victims of
the Hussein regime in Iraq, then some international body, such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or the UN, would be the legitimating authority.
To act on the authority of a “coalition of the willing” relies on vague ethical
criteria. US leaders indicated they possessed persuasive information that an
attack against the United States or US interests using weapons of mass destruction was possible, and that Iraq was advancing terrorism. Both the assertion of possible attack with WMD or conventional means and the
involvement of Iraq with terrorism (specifically al Qaeda) have since come
under considerable dispute, to say the least.
l Public Declaration. The second criterion, a public declaration of
an ultimatum, was met by the President on 19 March 2003 when he demanded
that Saddam Hussein and his sons disarm and step down from power in Iraq
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within 48 hours. Public communication of intentions for the use of military
force by the US-led coalition is clearly recognized.
l Just Intent. The war against Iraq presents problems, however, regarding the just intent of the US-led coalition. Conventional Just War logic
uses high standards to grant legitimacy for going to war. National self defense
and overcoming a grave evil, such as the suffering of innocents, are typical.
Just intent in Operation Iraqi Freedom focused on the preemptive
use of force to disarm Saddam Hussein and replace his regime, based on
defending against an imminent threat. Dr. Michael Walzer, Professor of Social Science at the Institute of Advanced Study, in Princeton, N.J., argues
that the intent to disarm Iraq was just, based on the failed inspections linked
to monitoring compliance with weapons restrictions. The intended end—a
disarmed Iraq—met with international support. However, many nations
preferred the ways of sanctions and inspections, not war and regime change.
To Paul J. Griffiths, Professor of Catholic Studies at the University of Illinois, the definition of imminent has not changed: “It means the gun is at your
head.” And in the case of Iraq, “We just don’t have that.” He states that redefining imminent offers “well-intentioned support for US foreign policy, but
it’s not defensible in terms of traditional Just War theory.”27 Professor
Griffiths proposes two standards for a just, preemptive attack in the framework of Just War:
l Knowledge that the threat is in place; that nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons are armed and ready to be used.
l Knowledge that the weapons are aimed at the nation proposing
preemption in self-defense.
The intended end of a disarmed Iraq was founded on the conviction
that the regime of Saddam Hussein had both motive and means to launch biological and chemical attacks and would very soon have a capability for nuclear
attack or the threat of nuclear attack. Bush Administration proponents for preemption believed both standards proposed by Professor Griffiths were met.
Two practical questions intrude on this ethical discussion: How does one determine the threat from a regime continuously demonstrating no willingness to
comply with treaties, international sanctions, or standards of truth-telling, and
what culpability rests on the preempting nation if and when the rationale for
preemption is proven false?
Another facet of the just intent for war with Iraq was the idea of protecting innocent people from humanitarian abuses. International law has developed rapidly along these lines in recent interventions in Africa and even
more explicitly in the former Yugoslavia. In 1999, when “ethnic cleansing” in
Kosovo exceeded an unspecified threshold for public and international tolerance, the United States led NATO in an intervention, employing air attacks
30
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and the evacuation of noncombatants, to bomb the Serbian forces into stalemate and halt the slaughter of Albanian Muslims. This was one of the most
vivid examples of an international intervention within the boundaries of a
sovereign state to protect innocents from humanitarian abuses. In Saddam’s
Iraq, there were graphic reports and references to widespread humanitarian
abuses, including the use of chemical weapons against separatist, civilian
populations in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and the religiously distinct
minority in southern Iraq. But humanitarian intervention was never seriously
advanced by either the Clinton or Bush administrations, until it was included
as part of the justification for ousting the regime of Saddam Hussein. In this
instance, protecting victims from humanitarian abuse is probably most accurately described as an ex post facto reason for war.
In the case of the war on Iraq, regime change was a way, not an end,
and the end of a disarmed Iraq was determined by the Bush Administration to
be achievable only by regime change. Regime change as a “morally desirable
side-effect”28 of disarming an aggressor is consistent with the Just War ethic.
Regime change as the end or intent falls outside the recognized standards of
Just War logic. Regime change was incorporated explicitly in the justification
for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Regime change is not a status quo ante bellum
and commits the nation far beyond military application to postwar responsibility, building a new, politically functioning nation. This is a commitment
shouldered determinedly, so far, by the United States, while most other nations and the UN still search for a morally and politically acceptable role. Regarding the ethic of regime change, in his letter to President Bush on 13
September 2002, Bishop Wilton Gregory, president of the US Catholic Conference of Bishops, asked, “Should not a distinction be made between efforts
to change unacceptable behavior of a government and efforts to end that government’s existence?”29 This echoes the debate about the appropriate ends
and leads to questions of appropriate ways—destroying Iraq, containing Iraq,
isolating Iraq.
The vortex of the debate about just cause for this war swirls here:
Was disarming Iraq morally required to prevent a destruction or endangerment of the core human value of freedom? Was disarming Iraq possible only
through military victory over Iraq and replacing the government of Saddam
Hussein? In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US-led coalition of nations acted to destroy the military and political forces of Iraq, and sought to
replace the regime to protect all freedom-loving people, extend freedom to
Iraq, and increase stability in the region.
The argument for this just cause, or just intent, points toward the
central dimension of an emerging paradigm shift in the ethics of war. Preemptive war to prevent a potential threat through regime change using military
Winter 2004-05
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“The Bush doctrine contends that
preemption is right, just,
and different from aggression.”

force exemplifies the change proposed in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Disarming and restructuring a nation using preemptive or preventive war
is driven by an ideal future vision, not defense of or return to the status quo.
This model or framework for action employs military force to improve the
lot of citizens in a foreign land while eliminating a real or potential threat to
the territory of the United States, allies, and US political or other interests.
This ethic asserts an idealist, universal, God-given liberty as the bedrock for
decisionmaking. This freedom is to be advanced by the United States with or
without coalition partners, not as a model nation or political persuader.
l Proportionality. Proportionality aims to limit the cost and damage of war. In the discussion of Iraq, proportionality relates to the validity of
the threats. A strong aspect of the Bush Administration’s case for war is the
worst-case risks associated with weapons of mass destruction. If tens of
thousands—or millions—of people were killed by attacks with WMD, or
should the entire Western way of life and the values of liberty and selfdetermination be obliterated, obviously the charge of negligence would rest
against those who failed to act.
In the case of protecting innocents, proportionality becomes more
tangible. Proportionality is intended to engage both restraint in the use of
deadly force and precision in employing such force. In both regards, the coalition invasion of Iraq is viewed as acceptable in the damage inflicted to disarm Saddam.
Critics of the case for war argue that Operation Iraqi Freedom violated the Just War ethic because Iraq had not attacked nor threatened to attack
the United States or other nations, so no proportional response was indicated.
If the threat was genuinely the possible use of weapons of mass destruction,
then disarming Iraq’s regime seems proportional. Regime change, however,
exceeds that measure.
l Last Resort. As noted above, the standard of using war as a last resort is logically difficult. Something other than going to war can always be
done. However, the prudential test is whether or not all reasonable options
have been exhausted prior to launching military action. In the case of Iraq,
32
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was military action the sad but necessary next step? Some of the harshest criticisms of the Bush Administration have focused on this criterion. Opponents
of military action argue that the UN’s inspection regime should have been
given more time. But when does more time become too much time?
The Bush Administration’s emphasis on the threat of WMD was an
attempt to move the threshold of last resort forward and to discount the applicability of deterrence. In the book Structure for Scientific Revolution30 a paradigm shift is said to occur when old scientific data can no longer explain new
facts. The 2002 National Security Strategy argues that we face a threat that
cannot be managed within the old paradigm, so a new paradigm is created.
Preemption based on partial but sufficient evidence that we face a clear but
not necessarily present danger is this new paradigm. In this view, the danger
is so unpredictable and volatile that we must act immediately rather than
waiting to act only as a last resort.
In the case of Iraq, supporters of military action sooner rather than
later point to the habitual deceit and evasion of Saddam Hussein—signing a
1991 treaty he consistently violated, perpetually shooting at coalition aircraft
in the UN “no fly zone,” and agreeing to inspections of weapon sites only to
create obstacles and diversions with inspection teams. Should we have
sought more inspections? Continued sanctions? Such steps are always alternatives, but the pragmatics of choosing when to consider war as a last resort
are based on the prudential political and diplomatic perceptions of restraint,
not on a theoretical last act.
l Reasonable hope for success. The reasonable hope for success is a
criterion intended to prevent the pointless use of military forces that have no
chance at victory. In effect, this protects military personnel and nations from
authorities who recklessly steer a nation into armed conflict. In the case of the
US-led coalition against Iraq, there is little doubt of the military superiority of
the allied forces. Questions about success became more complex in two areas.
First, would the application of military force provoke attacks with weapons of
mass destruction that otherwise would have been unlikely?31 Second, reasonable hope for military success does not necessarily lead to reasonable hope for
success in other domains of Iraq’s future. Is there reasonable hope for success
in building a secure and free Iraq? Will military success against Iraq provoke
other regional conflict? And following a successful military campaign to
change the regime, does the US-led coalition have the resources and endurance
to effect the changes necessary in creating a stable government?

Focus on Imminent Threat as a Just Cause
Anticipatory self-defense is recognized in international law and Just
War tradition as a just cause. The first test for this is whether one’s action is
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self-defense or aggression. Professor William Galston teaches at the University of Maryland and is Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy. He summarized much legal and philosophical argument by specifying
four criteria of preemption as self-defense. These criteria are not dichotomous, either/or categories, but each presents a continuum of possibilities for
consideration: the severity of the threat, the degree of probability of the
threat, the imminence of the threat, and the cost of delay.32
Historically, these four specifications emerged from the British military attack against an American ship, the Caroline, on 29 December 1837,
when British forces crossed the Niagara River to the US side to intercept assistance reportedly being provided to Canadian revolutionaries by US nationals. Daniel Webster subsequently argued in a letter to Lord Ashburton that a
British case for self-defense was untenable, because the risks to Britain did
not meet the four criteria.
Self-defense has been used sparingly in justifying preemption in
the West over many centuries. Even in the post hoc analysis of World War
II, preemption of Nazism by Allied power has not been advanced.33 In an
earlier case, historian David Fromkin analyzes the causes of World War I:
“The archduke’s murder was the excuse Austria-Hungary wanted to declare
war on Serbia. Things might have ended there. But then Germany, using
Austria’s war as its excuse, declared war on Russia on the possibility that
Russia might interfere in the Serbian conflict.”34 This was aggression, not
anticipatory self-defense.
Applying the four standards of preemption, one can reconsider “imminent threat” and interpret the proposal in the National Security Strategy for
“adapting the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today’s adversaries.”35 Professor Galston applied these four criteria to the
case for war against Iraq as follows.
l Threat. In the analysis of the US national leadership, the threat
was high. In the worst case, Iraq had nuclear weapons (or would have them
within a near-term) that could be used against US citizens, allies, or friends,
or transferred to terrorists.
l Probability. The probability of the threat was certain, based on
analysis by US national leadership. This issue of probability is the decisive
point of contention in international discussions after the fact. As certain as the
Bush Administration was about the probability of Iraq’s motives and capability to use weapons of mass destruction, France, Germany, Russia, and the majority of the rest of the world were not convinced (or at least would not act on
the evidence presented).
l Imminence. No persuasive case was argued that the threat was imminent, at least in any conventional definition of imminent.
34
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l The cost of delay. This appeared to be low; that is, delay was rejected by the United States and other willing coalition partners based primarily on the analysis of the past intransigence of Saddam, not the risk of delay. In
fact, most other nations argued in favor of delay, to allow inspections and
sanctions to work.
Anticipatory self-defense, though technically justified, is an unusual case in military ethics and is not supported in this instance. Consequently we are left with the revolutionary idea of redefining imminent threat
and just cause according to the Bush doctrine. The Bush doctrine contends
that preemption is right, just, and different from aggression, transcends imperialism, and is based on a vision of the future achievable through preemptive
or preventive war. The Bush doctrine builds on a vision of extending liberty
and an open-market economy, and authorizes invading a sovereign nation to
topple a regime through preemptive war against an enemy, using criteria such
as these:
l The enemy is controlled by a despotic ruler with a record of aggression.
l The enemy threatens, directly or through proxies, neighboring
people or nations.
l The enemy seeks weapons of mass destruction to use against or
threaten others.
l The enemy is stoppable now, and delaying attack only increases
the cost of action later.
l The enemy is unresponsive to persuasion, negotiation, deterrence,
or conciliation.

Conclusions
In the case of achieving the end of a disarmed Iraq, the ethically preferred way would have been to use coercive inspections based on a significantly larger coalition, preferably an established alliance of nations. Even
stronger legitimacy would have been based on a majority, if not a consensus,
of member states of the United Nations to implement coercive inspections.36
As stated in the introduction, a new paradigm for right thinking and
right acting in war may be emerging. Preempting a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack (or any attack) against innocent people is a morally desirable action. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, the questions remain, “When
is imminent, and when is too late?” But these questions can be framed in Just
War language. The Bush doctrine of preemption builds on a conviction that using armed force is just when based on partial but sufficient evidence of a clear,
unpredictable, and volatile danger that threatens the security of US citizens,
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liberty for people in other nations, and the rational structure of nation-states.
Redefining imminent, as called for in the National Security Strategy, may
mean a clear danger is not necessarily a present danger.
The 2002 National Security Strategy, then, is used to justify selective killing of some to achieve a greater good of liberty for many others,
driven by an idealistic approach for universal human freedom. This is a strategic move oriented toward future vision and away from the recent, realist historical politics of a balance of power or a balance of terror. In the ethical
framework of increased good for the most people and balancing ethical ends
and means, the Bush doctrine advances democracy at the tip of a spear. This
application of military force presents a moral dilemma.
The case of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a catalyst for further thinking
about this new ethic regarding the use of force, particularly the leaner, rapid,
decisive, lethal new force of the US military. The pivotal issue about retaining
“imminent threat” but redefining its criteria for preemptive self-defense is
driven by the threat of terrorists with the means and motives to employ weapons of mass destruction. Until further moral thinking provides a more substantial ethical framework for decisionmaking, however, it seems proper to
withdraw references to preemption as a doctrinal element of the National Security Strategy. Further, even should nations proceed toward a new ethic for
launching war preemptively or preventively, consideration of second-order
effects is important. Even accepting the benefit of preventing Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons, will other nations pursuing nuclear weapons move
more quickly and covertly, believing the United States would attack during
their pursuit of WMD (such as Iraq) but not nations possessing them (such as
North Korea)?

Recommended Areas for Further Study
The application of preventive war breaks new ground in the ethics of
going to war. In the age of a so-called “clash of cultures,” how can nations inheriting the Just War tradition find ethical frameworks which intersect with,
if they don’t correlate with and complement, the ethical perspectives of nations without this Just War legacy?
In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States and other
coalition nations were involved with military forces enforcing a no-fly zone.
Diplomatic efforts to monitor, if not diminish, Iraq’s weapons-related activities meant warfare overarched Iraq’s interaction with the rest of the world.
Lacking a clear and certain view of Iraq’s capabilities, especially for weapons
of mass destruction, the issue of imminent threat was blurred. This blurring
applied to the practical matter at hand, with questions about what weapons
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Saddam Hussein might have and when and where he might use them. On a
theoretical level, the case of Iraq’s possible possession of WMD raised the
question to be further explored regarding an imminent threat: How does imminence apply in cases where time and space before attack are not clearly discernible? In other words, when is it timely and when is it too late to act?
Another recommended area for further investigation involves distinguishing between preemption against non-state or “stateless” terrorists
and their organizations37 and sovereign states. Distinguishing among nations
which harbor or financially support terrorists gives a focal point for conventional military, diplomatic, and economic planning. An additional area for investigation is the assertion that non-state actors and some states (specifically
Iraq, though this will certainly apply in other future cases) are beyond deterrence. For those doubtful about deterrence, this method was linked and limited by the Cold War standoff between the United States and the former Soviet
Union. Deterrence works in a framework of rational thought and a balance of
power. However, even in hypothetical cases of holy war, which was not precisely a factor between the adversaries in Operation Iraqi Freedom, are deterrence and containment possible when dealing with so-called “rogue” states?
How, besides deterrence, can one explain Iraq’s not using its weapons of mass
destruction against its avowed enemy who was within range of its delivery
systems—Israel?
Finally, regime change was based on analysis that the only way to
disarm Saddam Hussein and release the grip of his tyranny was by going to
war. This is a significant departure from Just War standards where the status
quo ante bellum is normative. This may, once again, indicate the importance
of developing a new ethic when dealing in cases of conflict across the cultural
divides separating nations inheriting and relying on a Just War tradition and
those nations where the status quo represented a source of the conflict in the
first place.
Given the decade of broken promises and provocative pin-pricks by
Iraq toward the United Nations and the coalition of the early 1990s, perhaps
Operation Iraqi Freedom is not a “pure” case of preemptive or preventive war.
But if military forces are to be used to extend liberty, democracy, and free enterprise based on a universal principle of liberty, and if these forces will be
called on by national leaders to wage war preemptively, or preventively, then
it is imperative to probe for ethical models on which military personnel and
legitimate political leaders can launch such wars.
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